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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines recent efforts to expand competitive opportunities in the electric power
sector in the U.S. I start with a brief overview of the structure and regulation of the U.S. electricity
sector as it existed in the mid-1980s. I then turn to a discussion of the role of what I will call
"wholesale market competition" and how it has expanded during the last decade. Finally, I will
discuss more recent efforts to expand competitive opportunities for retail customers. I conclude with
some thoughts about future developments.
THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SECTOR2
a. Industry Structure
There are over 3,000 public utilities engaged in the generation, transmission and/or
distribution of electricity in the United States. 3 These entities vary widely in size, structure and
ownership form. Roughly 75% of U.S. generating capacity and retail sales of electricity are
accounted for by over 100 investor-owned utilities (IOUs). These IOUs traditionally have been
vertically integrated in the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, providing
"bundled" service to retail customers which they serve exclusively in specific geographic areas.
IOUs vary widely in size from very small systems with a few hundred megawatts of load, serving
'Prepared for conference on "Competition in the Electricity Supply Industry: Experience from Europe and
the United States," Copenhagen, September 23-24, 1994. Research support from the MIT Center for Energy
and Environmental Policy Research is gratefully acknowledged.
I1 offer only a very brief overview of the structure and regulatory framework governing the U.S.
electricity sector. For a more detailed discussion see Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) and Joskow (1989).
'In addition, there are over 4,000 "non-utility" generating facilities which provide electricity to a host
industrial customer or sell it to a local utility for resale.
2a single small metropolitan area, to very large systems with over 20,000 Mw of capacity serving
customers is several adjacent states (e.g. American Electric Power Company, an interstate holding
company with operating subsidiaries serving portions of seven states.)
There are roughly 2,000 "publicly-owned" municipal and state4 utilities. These entities
account for about 8% of utility supplied generation. Many of these entities were, for most of their
histories, small unintegrated distribution companies serving a single municipality. Historically, they
relied primarily on an IOU that surrounded them to provide the generation service that they required
to serve their customers. As I will discuss in more detail presently, by the 1970s these municipal
systems were increasingly able to provide for their generation needs through joint-ownership of new
generating facilities and through purchased power contracts with competing supply sources other than
their host utility in an evolving wholesale market. To enable them to do so, the local utility had to
supply transmission or "wheeling" service to provide a contract path between the competing
generation source and the municipal distribution company's load. These arrangements were
facilitated by the creation of a variety of state agencies (e.g. the Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale
Electric Company) which aggregated the needs of multiple municipal distributors, financed and
constructed new generating facilities to serve their needs. There also exist several large municipal
electric power system which are fully vertically integrated and, aside from ownership form, are
indistinguishable from IOUs (e.g. Los Angles Department of Water and Power and the Sacramento
Municipal Utility District).
Beginning during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the federal government began to
implement policies to bring low-cost electricity to rural areas and to develop the hydro-electric
potential on the nation's rivers. The Rural Electric Cooperative program provided (and continues
to provide) low-interest loans and other assistance to cooperative distribution and generating entiu•s.
There are roughly 1,000 rural electric cooperative operating in the U.S. today.5 They accounted
4When I use the term "state" in what follows I will be referring to one or more of the 50 states that make
up the U.S. When I use the term "federal" I will be referring to the national government in Washington.
D.C.
'They are no longer all rural and the people served by them are not necessarily poor.
3for 5% of the electricity supplied by utilities in 1992. Together, municipal and cooperative
distribution system account for nearly 25 % of U.S. electricity sales. The differences between what
they sell and what they generate is made up for primarily with purchases from IOUs and federal
Power Marketing Agencies. The federal government's efforts to develop hydroelectric capacity on
the nation's rivers led to the construction of dams and the creation of several Federal Power
Marketing Agencies (e.g. Tennessee Valley Authority and Bonneville Power Authority) to operate
these facilities and to sell the power they produce to utilities for resale to ultimate retail customers.6
Federal entities account for about 8% of the generation in the U.S. Under federal law, cooperative,
municipal and state-owned utilities have preference to this power which is often priced well below
market value.
In 1992, IOU, municipal, and cooperative utilities and federal power marketing agencies
operated generating facilities with aggregate capacity of 740,000 Mw.7  These facilities rely on a
variety of different fuels to produce electricity (56% coal, 22% nuclear, 10% natural gas, 3% oil,
and 9% hydroelectric, although fuel use varies widely from region to region.) From a physical
operating perspective, the organization of these entities into physically integrated electric power
networks is fairly complex. Vertically integrated utilities typically operate their own "control areas."
The control area operator is responsible for dispatching generating plants, balancing load and
resources, maintaining frequency and voltage on its transmission network, coordinating operations
with interconnected control areas and scheduling exchanges of electricity between them. In some
areas of the country, utilities have joined together to create "tight power pools" which act as control
areas for multiple utilities and centrally dispatch all of the generating facilities in the pool based on
6Some of these federal entities went on to build fossil and nuclear capacity as well once they had exhausted
the hydroelectric potential in their respective areas.
'There was another 55,000 Mw of "non-utility" generating capacity in operation in 1992 as well. These
facilities are primarily "qualifying facilities" (QF) under the Public Utilities Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA).
which I will discuss presently.
economic criteria and without regard to ownership. 8 For example, the New England Power Pool
created a single control area for the utilities in the six New England States and is responsible for
dispatching virtually all of the generating facilities in that region based on a minimum operating cost
criterion. The New York Power Pool provides central dispatch for all of the utilities in New York,
and the PJM pool centrally dispatches generation for the utilities in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and
Maryland.
All together, however, there are over 140 separate control areas in the U.S. These control
areas are linked together into three synchronized AC systems: The Eastern System, covering the
utilities (roughly) east of the Rocky Mountains (and portions of eastern Canada), the Western
System, covering the western states (and portions of western Canada and Mexico), and a separate
system that covers most of Texas. The control areas within each of the two major interconnected
sytems rely on a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral interconnection and coordination
agreements to maintain reliability, provide for economical exchanges of electricity, and to guard
against free riding problems (e.g. loop flow, differences between scheduled flows and actual flows,
etc.). A set of 9 regional reliability regions have been created to develop operating rules and to
facilitate coordination among these many interdependent entities.
b. Economic Regulation: States
In what follows, I will focus on the IOU sector, because it is by far the largest sector and
the one that has been affected most significantly by the expansion of competitive opportunities. The
origin of most investor-owned utilities can be traced to municipal franchises for the distribution of
electricity that began to be issued in the 1890s. Regulation of rates and service standards was
originally the responsibility of the local municipality issuing the franchise. As the electricity sector
grew and transmission and generation technology developed, extensive merger activity between small
independent distribution companies took place. Utilities grew to span geographic areas that
'Dispatch is based on the marginal operating costs of the various units that are part of the pool subject to
must run, transmission, voltage, and other constraints. The owners of the generating facilities share the
savings achieved by central dispatch compared to a simulated "self dispatch."
5encompassed many cities and towns. By 1905, individual states began to create state public utility
commissions which took over regulatory responsibilities from the municipalities. 9 By 1920, two-
thirds of the states had moved to a state commission-based regulatory system and today all of the
states with IOUs have state commissions with broad responsibility to regulate retail prices, and to
promote the economical and reliable supply of electricity by IOUs.
Although there are some variations, the basic nature of economic regulation of electric
utilities is quite similar from state to state. IOUs generally have a de facto exclusive franchise to
make electricity sales at retail in a well defined geographic area. They have a legal obligation to
serve all of the retail customers located in their service areas economically and reliably based on
tariffed rates that are not "unduly" discriminatory. Most IOUs have fulfilled their service obligations
under their retail distribution franchises and state laws by taking an ownership interest in the
generating and transmission capacity required to serve the needs of their retail customers (i.e. they
vertically integrated). In return for their exclusive distribution franchises, IOUs are subject to
extensive economic regulation by state commissions. The state commissions regulate the prices that
the utilities can charge customers, the non-price terms and conditions of service, and are often
actively involved in decisions about investments in new generating and transmission facilities.'0
State commissions typically rely on what is called "cost of service" or "rate of return"
regulation to determine the prices that utilities can charge. Prices (and associated adjustment
formulas) are determined in evidentiary hearings. These hearings are divided into two phases. The
first phase determines the utility's overall "revenue requirements" or "rate level". The second phase
determines the utility's "rate structure." That is, how the total "revenue requirements" will be
recovered through specific tariffs made available to different types of customers (residential, farm.
small commercial, large industrial, etc.). To determine the utility's revenue requirements, the
commission must determine the "allowable" operating costs of the utility (e.g. fuel, maintenance, and
9Municipally-owned utilities are generally subject to economic regulation by their respective murucipal
governments rather than by state public utility commissions.
'tSome states require formal approvals before utilities can invest in major new facilities, while others
review these decisions ex post.
other operating costs) and the "capital related" charges that the utility is allowed to include in its
rates to cover the depreciation, interest costs, and the cost of capital associated with equity
investments in generation, transmission and distribution facilities. These capital related charges are
determined by first computing the utilities "allowable" capital stock or "rate base," and then
determining the appropriate depreciation charges and the "fair rate of return" that the utility should
be allowed to earn on this rate base. Virtually all commission have come to adopt a "depreciated
original cost" accounting system to determine the rate base and annual depreciation charges. This
accounting system in turn requires that the fair rate of return reflect the nominal cost of capital
incurred by the utility if the investors are to recover fully their investments in utility assets."
Not surprisingly, most of the controversy over rates in rate hearings turns on which operating
costs should be "allowed" and which "disallowed" because they are unnecessary, which capital
investments should be included in rate base, and what the appropriate "fair return" on investment
should be. Thus, these hearings provide a framework for the regulatory process to penalize a utility
for incurring unnecessary operating costs or for making "inefficient" investments. The rules
governing these decisions are fairly vague and subject to a great deal of controversy and sometimes
influenced by political pressures.
Of most relevance to the discussion that follows, however, is the treatment of investments
in long-lived facilities (or long term contractual commitments to purchase power). Should the
"efficiency" of these investments be measured ex ante, based on the information available when the
investment decisions were made or ex post, based on actual realizations of demand, fuel prices,
technological change, etc.? Most commissions have taken an ex ante approach, recognizing that this
is the approach that is most consistent with prevailing cost of service ratemaking techniques used to
determine prices. As a result, whether the costs associated with a facility are included in rates or
not generally depends on whether the associated investment was "prudent" or "imprudent" given the
"See Schmalensee and the references he cites for the properties of a depreciated original cost accounting
and ratemaking system.
information available to managers when the investment decisions were made.12
This ratemaking system has the property that the expected present discounted value of the
cash flows associated with capital related charges equals the cost of the original investment at the
time the investment is made, and therefore satisfies an important investment viability constraint
(investment will only be forthcoming if the expected discounted value of future cash flows is greater
than or equal to the cost of the investment) and fairness or rent extraction constraint (customers are
charged no more than the "cost of service" over the life-cycle of capital investments)." However,
it also has the property that the prices charged at any point in time may be too high or too low
compared to the true economic cost of service at that point in time. For example, if there is a
demand slump and their is excess capacity, regulated prices will rise to cover the fixed costs that
must be spread over a smaller sales base rather than fall to reflect the fact that the marginal cost of
additional sales in the short run is quite low."4
This "cost plus" ratemaking system has been criticized for providing poor incentives for.cost
minimization. While this regulatory system, as with all regulatory systems (and most markets), is
far from perfect, it is not a pure cost plus system. As I have discussed elsewhere, there are two
primary attributes that provide incentives to control costs." First, prices are not constantly
readjusted to reflect changes in costs and the associated "regulatory lag" provides incentives to
reduce costs.'" Second, regulators have the authority to "disallow" costs for ratemaking pursposes
'
2Regulatory rules must adhere to a U.S. constitutional requirement that they provide the utility with a
"reasonable" opportunity to recover its costs, including a fair return on its investment. Depreciated onginal
cost ratemaking is only compatible with an ex ante evaluation system. This is (to put it simply) because this
ratemaking technique does not allow a utility to earn more than book accounting costs when the value of
electricity exceeds these accounting costs. Disallowing capital items when the market value is less than the
accounting cost would make investments to appear unprofitable ex ante.
"In theory, depreciated original cost ratemaking has the property that the expected present discounted
value of future cash flows is equal to the depreciated original cost of the facility at every point in time as well
See generally Schmalensee and the references he cites.
"Appropriate rate design changes can mitigate this kind of distortion, however.
"See Joskow and Schmalansee (1986) and Joskow (1989).
'
6lndeed, the much touted "price cap" regulation in practice is institutionalized regulatory lag.
if they conclude that they are unnecessary or inefficient.
Once the "revenue requirements" are determined in a hearing, the Commission must then
determine the "rate structure" that will define the specific prices that will be charged to individual
types of customers to yield (roughly) the aggregate revenue requirement that has been determined
to be reasonable. Utilities typically have a large number of tariffs available to customers that fall
into different size and voltage classes. Average prices for small residential and commercial
customers are generally relatively high, reflecting the fact that they take power at low voltage and
require costly low-voltage distribution investments, and have low load factors. Average prices for
very large industrial customers are much lower reflecting the fact that they take power at high
voltages and have higher load factors. Political considerations and self-generation options also affect
these rate structure formation, a process that can be quite byzantine. Increasingly, U.S. utilities have
offered larger customers time-of-day rates and interruptible rates.
Retail rates determined by state commissions using this type of regulatory process vary
widely across the U.S. Indeed, they vary widely within individual geographic regions of the U.S.
Table 1 displays the average residential and industrial rates for a cross-section of U.S. utilities
located around the country. The rate variations reflect in part regional variations in fuel and
construction costs, differences in environmental requirements and differences in the mix of
customers, load factors, and service area density. However, they also reflect historical differences
in the perceived economics of nuclear capacity and associated commitments to this technology, state
regulatory policies toward cogeneration and small power production facilities (see below), and
variations in excess capacity in 1992.
c. Economic Regulation: Federal
Until 1935, the federal government played almost no role in the regulation of electric utilities.
However, two pieces of legislation passed in 1935 created such a federal regulatory role. The
Federal Power Act of 1935 extended federal regulatory jurisdiction to interstate "wholesale" power
sales and interstate transmission service. Wholesale power sales are defined as sales of electricity
by one utility to another utility. Transmission service has traditionally been defined in the same way
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to cover sales of transmission service from one utility to another utility to support an associated
power transaction. The Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission -- FERC) was given the responsibility to implement these regulatory responsibilities.'7
Until recently, the economic regulatory role of the FERC was fairly modest. Initially, the
FPC's (now FERC) economic regulations focused primarily on sales made by vertically integrated
utilities to unintegrated municipal distribution utilities to which they provided "full requirements
service."'" A typical vertically integrated utility's wholesale requirements load generally was a
small fraction (e.g. less than 10%) of its total load (retail plus wholesale), however. The FPC/FERC
used cost of service principles similar to those used by state commissions (discussed above) to
determine the rates that could be charged to these wholesale requirements customers. The FERC
also imposed a de facto obligation to serve these customers by requiring FERC approval for
termination of service.
The FERC also regulates wholesale "coordination" transactions between integrated utilities.
These include short term trades of energy between interconnected utilities, capacity transactions, and
power pooling and and inter-control area coordination arrangements. Although these arrangements
were technically regulated based on accounting costs, the FERC allowed a considerable amount of
discretion to the parties to negotiate mutually attractive arrangements when "real utilities" where on
both sides of the transaction. Wholesale transactions of this type were of negligible importance for
many years. However, as interconnection, coordination, and power pooling expanded after World
War II, wholesale transactions became an increasingly important way for the hundred and fifty or
so vertically integrated utilities to take advantage of economical opportunities to substitute low cost
supplies made available by third parties for their own internal high cost supplies and to reduce the
costs of maintaining reliability.
It is important to understand, however, that until recently, vertically integrated utilities did
not make investments in new generating facilities to serve this wholesale "coordination" market.
'
7The Federal Power Commission has other responsibilities governing the electric power system as eCll
'8FERC has always had a bias toward protecting the small municipal distribution systems against the re4d
or imagined efforts to exploit them by surrounding IOUs.
Rather, sales in this market were typically from capacity built to serve retail customers, but which
was temporarily excess to the needs of these customers. Moreover, FERC has no certification or
approval authority over generation or transmission facilities and until 1992 did not have the authority
to order utilities to provide transmission service to other utilities that might have wanted to shop in
the wholesale market. The coordination market evolved primarily to facilitate the economical
operation of existing generating facilities based on regional rather than only individual utility supply
and demand conditions and to reduce reserve requirements by substituting emergency support
arrangements with neighboring utilities for stand-alone reserve capacity. These factors, combined
with reliance on cost of service regulation made it impossible for an independent generating sector
to emerge in the U.S. prior to recent years."9
FERC also has exclusive jurisdiction over the terms and conditions of interstate transmission
arrangements. 20 Since retail customers have been served exclusively by their local utility and the
utility sells them a bundled product, the transmission arrangements that have been the focus of
FERC's regulatory efforts have generally been in conjunction with wholesale power transactions.
FERC has relied and continues to rely today on very crude pricing arrangements for transmission
service. Transmission service is generally provided by utilities on a point to point basis, but using
a "postage stamp" rate based on the average embedded cost of its transmission network.2 ' FERC
recently expanded its accepted methodology to include some incremental cost pricing principles,
expanded the types of transmission services it expects utilities to provide, and is currently in the
process of reevaluating how it establishes prices for transmission service.22 More on this below.
Although FERC's role in the regulation of the electric power industry was relatively modest
'
9The interaction of these institutions as an impediment to the evolution of an independent wholesale
generating sector is explained in Joskow (1989), p. 133 and 139.
'Virtually any transmission or wheeling transaction which uses high voltage transmission facilities is likely
to be deemed to be an interstate transaction even if the buyer and the seller are located in the same state.
2See Joskow (1993a).
'2Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for
Transmission Services Provided by Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, June 30, 1993.
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until recently, this role has and is likely to continue to increase as competition evolves. There are
two interrelated reasons for this. First, as an independent generation sector emerges, generating
services will increasingly be sold to distribution utilities under contract rather than being produced
solely from generating facilities they own (vertical integration). These sales will be FERC
jurisdictional while internal production is state jurisdictional. Second, as both unbundled wholesale
and retail transactions increase with more competition, transmission and related control area services
will be provided on an unbundled basis. The bulk of these transactions are likely to be FERC
jurisdictional as well. Furthermore, the organization, access to and pricing of transmission and
control area services will be of fundamental importance for the nature of the performance a
competitive electricity sector. These "grid issues" are of special concern in the United States where
we have a highly balkanized grid made up of over 140 interconnected control areas. The system
has held together reasonably well as a result of the evolution of cooperative arrangements between
utilities that did not compete much with one another and that could rely on cost of service regulation
to "true up" the failure properly to price transmission and control area services and to deal with a
variety of free rider and externality problems that emerge on a synchronized AC network with many
interconnected independent control area operators.
In 1935 Congress also passed the Public Utility Holding Company Act. This law was
motivated by a variety of financial and regulatory abuses that allegedly were associated with the large
multistate public utility holding companies that emerged in the U.S. during the 1920s and early
1930s. The provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act are complex and I will not go
into all of them in detail here. Let me touch on few provisions of PUHCA (pre-1992) that were of
special concern from the perspective of the evolution of a competitive electricity sector.
A public utility holding company is defined as an entity that owns or controls one or more
public utility companies. Under U.S. law, a public utility company in turn is essentially any private
entity that generates, transmits, or distributes electricity to the public. A public utility holding
company is subject to a variety of regulations governing its organizational structure, the geographic
expanse of its activities, its financial structure, and the businesses that it can engage in. These
regulations are administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Exemptions from
the regulations are available for public utility holding companies whose utility subsidiaries primarily
provide service in a single state and whose total business activities are primarily in the utility sector.
The bulk of the electric utilities in the U.S. are either not holding companies23 or are organized as
exempt holding companies. There are about a dozen registered multistate holding companies that
are subject to the full force of the regulatory provisions of the Act. These entities must operate as
integrated systems, effectively limiting their activities to a single geographic area, and are limited
to lines of business that are functionally related to their utility businesses. 24
The original provisions of the Holding Company Act created significant barriers to the
creation of an independent generating sector made up of companies which owned generating facilities
around the country through a holding company structure. A non-utility (e.g. Bechtel) that sought
to own two or more independent generating facilities would be deemed to be a public utility holding
company and could become subject to regulation under the Act. As a public utility holding company
it would face restrictions on the non-utility businesses it could enter into and the geographic
distribution of its generating facilities. This effectively kept non-utilities out of the electricity supply
business, except to supply their own internal needs. An exempt utility holding company could
developed independent generating facilities, but if these facilities were located in states other than
the states where it provided distribution service it could lose its single state exemption and be
required to register as an interstate holding company. This is turn would subject it to new
regulations governing the lines of business it could enter into and limit its ownership of generation
to areas interconnected with its own system. Finally, registered holding companies could have. in
principal, develop independent generating facilities, but only in their own regions, and subject to
stringent SEC financing regulations governing debt/equity ratios. These regulations were fairly
potent barriers to the entry of independent generating companies into the U.S. electricity sector.:'
23State laws also often restrict the creation and activities of public utility holding companies.
2
"PUHCA also imposed significant impediments on U.S. public utility holding companies seeking to nuke
investments in generation, transmission, and distribution assets outside of the U.S.
25Although the primary barriers were IOU preferences for a vertically integrated structure and pre•allnt
cost of service regulations which limited the economic opportunities for merchant plants.
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PUHCA also restricted the ownership of foreign utility assets by U.S. utilities through a holding
company structure and restricted ownership of U.S. electricity supply assets by foreign holding
companies. As I will discuss presently, removing many of these barriers to the entry of IPPs was
a major motivation for the PUHCA reforms included in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
WHOLESALE MARKET COMPETITION
The term "wholesale market" in the U.S. refers to power and transmission service
transactions in which the buyer is a distribution utility (unintegrated or integrated) and the seller is
another utility (including independent generating companies). That is, it involves sales by generating
entities to distribution entities for resale to retail customers. The wholesale market does not include
direct sales of electricity to retail customers even if these customers are very large and purchase
power at high voltages. The wholesale market has been of increasing importance in the electric
power industry in the U.S. for decades, but because of the vertically integrated structure of the
industry, the existence of numerous interconnected control areas, and the nature of price regulation,
it has had a very special structure.
a. Wholesale Market Competition Prior to the QF/IPP Era
The wholesale market that has evolved in the U.S. since World War II is best understood by
focusing on two market segments. The first segment is what I will refer to as the requirements
customer market. The second segment is the coordination market segment. 26 Let me discuss each
in turn.
i. Wholesale Reauirements Services
The requirements customer market involves buyers who were unintegrated (largely municipal
and cooperative) distribution companies. Historically, they purchased their "full requirements" for
power from a proximate vertically integrated utility whose transmission network often surrounded
26This distinction was used explicitly by the FERC in its Notice of Inquiry into wholesale market
transactions in 1985. Notice of Inquiry re Regulation of Electricity Sales-for-Resale and Transmission Service.
31 FERC 61,376 (1985).
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them. The terms and conditions of these full requirements contracts or tariffs generally provided that
the integrated utility would plan for the needs of these distribution system customers, would supply
them with all the power they needed to meet their retail customers' load, and would charge prices
based on the average cost of supply, including capital charges associated with historical investments.
As I have already discussed, the associate prices for services are regulated by FERC using traditional
cost of service/rate of return regulatory principles. Basically, the rates for these customers were
determined in essentially the same way as the rates charged to large industrial customers, except the
regulatory forum was different. Since wholesale requirements customers generally accounted for a
small share of a utility's load, they essentially rode along on the tail of the state regulatory process
governing planning, resource procurement, certification, etc., and FERC tried to use symmetrical
cost of service ratemaking procedures so that costs did not get "trapped" between state and federal
regulatory procedures.
Some wholesale requirements customers complained about being forced to take all of their
bulk power requirements under regulated tariffs from the local utility to which they were "captive."
Some wanted the opportunity to plan, own and operate some or all of their own generation, either
individually or collectively with other utilities (that is they wanted to become vertically integrated). 2'
Others wanted the option to acquire some or all of their bulk power requirements from other utilities
in their- regions. In either case, the municipal distribution companies required access to the local
utility's transmission grid to "wheel" generation to the distribution system and to integrate dispersed
generating facilities efficiently. However, while the utilities providing requirements service did not
have an exclusive right to serve municipal utilities embedded in their networks, they also had no
regulatory obligation to provide these entities with access to their transmission networks since the
Federal Power Act did not give the FERC the authority to order utilities to provide transmission
service.
In order to get access to transmission systems of their host utilities wholesale requirements
"
2The availability of tax free financing to municipal utilities made ownership of generating facilities more
economical in some cases than purchasing power from a private utility whose financial instruments %cre
subject to income taxes.
15
customers turned to the antitrust laws for help. The Atomic Energy Act contained antitrust
provisions that made it possible for the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission) to attach antitrust conditions to nuclear plant licenses. Municipal utilities often used
this licensing process to obtain license conditions that required the utility to open up its transmission
system based on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions to enable them to acquire
some or all of their power requirements from competing supply sources. Municipal and cooperative
utilities also brought suits under the federal antitrust laws to obtain access to "essential" transmission
facilities.2  Furthermore, once a utility began to offer transmission service to some wholesale
requirements customers, FERC was able to use its authority to bar undue discrimination to extend
these services to others.
By the mid-1980s, the typical municipal or cooperative distribution utility had obtained
extensive transmission service from its host utility. In places like California and Florida, where there
was extensive litigation, municipal utilities typically were purchasing the bulk of their energy from
competing third parties or from generating facilities they owned rather than from the host veritically
integrated utility by the mid-1980s. While there have been ongoing disputes about the terms and
conditions of these services and the quality of the services available, by the mid-1980s unintegrated
distribution utilities that wanted to were able to acquire the bulk of their requirements from
competing suppliers, relying on their host utility as a backup for any requirements that they could
not fill with better deals with competing suppliers. Through various coordination and integration
arrangements with these host utilities, previously unintegrated distribution companies have been able
to integrate multiple generating sources and make long term and short term purchases from
competing suppliers. There is extensive competition among vertically integrated utilities to serve the
bulk power needs of these utilities.
Despite these changes over the last two decades, so-called transmission dependent utilities
(TDUs) have continued to complain about the reluctance of some host utilities to provide them with
all of the transmission and related services they desired. Their host utilities in turn have complained
"
2 Otter Tail Power Company v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) and Joskow (1982).
that the prices they are permitted by regulators to charge for residual power requirements and
transmission service are too low and are structured in a way that encourages free riding by these
customers. Until relatively recently, the primary agitation for expanding competitive opportunities
at the wholesale level, in particular imposing more extensive obligations on utilities that operate
transmission networks to provide access to them based on reasonable terms and conditions, have been
municipal and cooperative TDUs. Their objectives were not always meritorious, however, and the
mixture of competitive opportunities with regulated rates and service obligations for generation and
transmission service created numerous opportunities for inefficient regulatory gaming and rent
seeking behavior.
The markets for wholesale coordination services developed largely out of the needs of
proximate vertically integrated utilities which operated their own control areas to take advantage of
short run opportunities to exchange energy and capacity with neighboring utilities in order to reduce
the overall cost of operating their systems and to reduce the costs of maintaining reliability through
reserve sharing and emergency support agreements. Utilities throughout the United States have
routinely engaged in hourly exchanges of energy so that low cost generators in one control area that
would otherwise be idle can generate electricity to replace power that would otherwise have been
produced by a more costly generator located in another control area. In a sense, the coordination
markets developed as market alternatives to central economic dispatch of generators that would
otherwise be dispatched independently by each control area.29 The reliance on economy energy
transactions expanded very significantly after 1973 as large gaps emerged between oil, gas, and coal
prices. Over time, the range of products available in the coordination markets has also expanded.
Contractual arrangements with longer durations emerged and vertically integrated utilities came to
rely on medium term capacity and energy contracts to allow them to put some of their generating
facilities in reserve status (reducing non-fuel operating and maintenance costs) and to defer
construction of new generating facilities. These longer term capacity and energy contracts were
significantly different from the very short term coordination arrangements from which they emerged.
29In New England, New York, and the PJM areas, power pools with central economic dispatch were
substitutes for market coordination.
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Requirements customers also increasingly came to rely on contracts with competing integrated
utilities to supply some or all of their bulk power needs. These developments have eroded the
boundaries between requirements and coordination services markets.
It is important to understand, however, that these coordination markets, have been primarily
"excess capacity" markets. That is, utilities competed with one another to make sales to other
utilities (including unintegrated distribution companies) out of capacity originally built to serve their
retail franchise load (so-called "native load customers") pursuant to state cost of service and
certification regulations. The capacity might be excess to their needs for an hour, a day, a year, or
even ten years. If they can sell the associated energy and capacity to other utilities at any price
greater than the operating costs of the facilities, the net profit from these transactions can be used
to reduce retail rates or to enhance the utility's overall profits." However, utilities generally did
not build new generating facilities in anticipation of wholesale coordination market revenue.
Moreover, even for short term energy transactions, the bulk of a utility's generating capacity did not
compete directly in the market since it was consumed internally." Finally, the evolution of these
coordination market institutions has depended heavily on cooperative arrangements between utilities
that did not compete with one another for the vast bulk of their revenues and profits -- revenues
and profits received from retail service that each utility supplies exclusively.
FERC regulation of coordination transactions has provided fairly good incentives to induce
utilities to consummate short and medium term transactions when their are gains from trade. While
these transactions were always technically subject to cost of service regulation, FERC applied cost
of service regulation fairly flexibly. FERC gave utilities a lot of discretion in how they "cost-
justified" individual transactions and permitted explicit shared savings arrangements. The fact that
30State regulatory treatment of revenues and costs from wholesale transactions has varied very
significantly. Many states require at least some of the net profits from such transactions to be used to reduce
the rates that would otherwise be charged to retail customers.
310f course it competed indirectly since if it were cheaper to buy from third parties rather than to produce
from integrated facilities to serve retail customer needs that is the choice regulators expected utilities to make.
And while such behavior was probably typical for hourly transactions, regulatory distortions may have affected
decisions to mothball or retire existing generation in favor of purchasing cheaper replacement resources In the
market, or to defer construction of new capacity by purchasing from another utility.
FERC did not apply rigid cost of service formulas to regulate these rates is a major reason why the
coordination market grew so much during the 1970s and 1980s in response to growing regional
differences in marginal operating costs and supply/demand balances. Excess capacity and state
regulatory barriers to investments in new facilities increased both the supply and demand for medium
and long term capacity and energy transactions as well. But basically, wholesale market competition
served primarily to "smooth out" the short term operating inefficiencies that would otherwise be
associated with a long term generating capacity autarky policy applied by each individual vertically
integrated utility.
It is widely recognized that by the 1980s, the coordination markets were doing an excellent
job optimizing the short run utilization of generating facilities over wide geographic regions through
hourly, daily, and weekly transactions. However, the wholesale market was relied upon much less
by utilities to make it possible to mothball or close existing facilities before the end of their
accounting lives and even less as a substitute for owning their own generating capacity to meet the
long term needs of their retail distribution franchise customers. This was in part a consequence of
regulatory incentives and in part a consequence of the widespread belief that vertical integration was
necessary to finance and effectively integrate large costly generating facilities.
b. The QF/IPP Era
Title II of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) stimulated major
changes in wholesale power markets and public policy toward competition and vertical integration
in the U.S. electric power sector, although its most significant effects were not felt until the late
1980s. Prior to PURPA there was effectively no unintegrated independent generating sector in the
U.S. The bulk of the generation was either owned by vertically integrated utilities or fully
contracted under long term accounting cost-based contracts to distribution utilities. PURPA began
the process of creating an independent generation sector and the supporting market and regulatory
institutions to create a competitive market for new generating resources.
The primary motivation for PURPA was to encourage improvements in energy efficiency
through expanded use of cogeneration technology and to create a market for electricity produced
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from renewable fuels and fuel wastes. It was not motivated by a desire to restructure the electricity
sector and to create an independent competitive generation sector. However, it turned out to have
effects significantly different from what was intended when it was passed. PURPA provided that
all utilities engaged in the distribution of electricity were required to offer to purchase electricity
produced by certain qualifying cogeneration and certain small power production facilities using
renewable fuels (these facilities are generally referred to as "QFs"). Utilities had to offer a purchase
from QFs at a price that reflected the costs avoided by the utility by purchasing from the QF rather
than by generating itself. Cogenerators could use some of the electricity they produced to serve the
electrical load of a host industrial or commercial facility and sell the excess back to the utility or sell
their total output to the local utility. PURPA did not authorize QFs to make sales directly to retail
customers, but only to utilities, and with a few exceptions state laws generally do not permit direct
sales by QFs to retail customers either.
Thus, PURPA maintained the traditional model of a utility as a "portfolio manager" that must
acquire generating resources to serve the needs of its retail franchise customers which it serves on
an exclusive basis. However, rather than meeting this obligation only by owning and operating its
own generating facilities, utilities now had to look to QF supplies to meet their needs as well.
Moreover, PURPA provided exemptions to the Public Utility Holding Company Act to QF owners.
This made it possible for a large number of non-utility companies to enter the electric generauon
business as owners of QFs.3 2
After PURPA was passed in 1978, FERC and then the states proceeded to develop
regulations to implement it. FERC delegated primary responsibility to the states to specify detaled
implementation regulations to govern the relationship between utilities and QFs subject to FERC's
avoided cost regulations and PURPA facility qualifying criteria. Utilities began to enter into
contracts with QFs in the early 1980s and significant quantities of QF capacity began to come on mne
after 1985.
3 Utilities and public utility holding companies were allowed to own no more than a 50% interest in a QF
However, some of the most successful QF development and operating companies are subsidiaries of utulit
holding companies (an exempt holding company could retain its single state exemption and still have Intere-Wt
in QFs located anywhere in the U.S.).
The experience with PURPA since then has been a mixed bag. On the one hand, significant
investments in QF facilities have been made since PURPA was passed and QFs now account for
roughly 50,000 Mw of generating capacity. Figure #1 displays the growth in production by non-
utility generators (NUGs), which are primarily QFs, over the last 25 years. We have seen a very
rapid rate of growth in electricity supplied by NUGs since 1985. In the last couple of years, QFs
and other non-utility generation sources have accounted for a larger fraction of generating capacity
additions than have vertically integrated utilities. The power from these facilities is generally
purchased pursuant to long term take and pay incentive contracts in which prices are established
(very roughly) based on (imperfect) measures of market values at the time the contract is signed
rather than each individual suppliers' costs and which have substantial incentives for cost control and
performance. Many of these facilities have excellent performance records.
It is quite clear that entities which are not utilities can build and operate generating facilities
as efficiently as can utilities." Indeed, QF developers provided a major stimulus to advances in
CCGT technology and have been successful in applying this technology very efficiently. On the
other hand, the regulations governing QF procurement in a number of states forced utilities to buy
too much QF capacity at too high a price. Part of the problem was a natural consequence of the
inherent difficulties faced by regulators in determining a utility's expected avoided costs for use in
a 20 to 30 year firm power contract." In response to these problems, many states shifted from the
administrative determination of avoided cost-based prices at which utilities had to buy all QF power
that was offered, to competitive bidding programs in which utilities estimate their capacity needs and
then put these needs out for competitive bids." Unfortunately, these bidding programs became
embedded in complex and highly politicized "integrated resource management" processes in which
numerous considerations other than cost were taken into account to determine what utilities would
"Although most QFs are relatively small compared to utility units and are not fully dispatchable.
3
'The contracts typically fix a capacity payment that does not change over the life of the contract and an
energy payment that may be fixed or vary with fuel prices.
"These developments are discussed in more detail in Joskow (1989).
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have to buy from whom at what price. Especially in states in the Northeast and in California these
planning processes created even further pressures for utilities to purchase capacity that was not
needed at prices that were too high.
Perhaps the most important legacy of PURPA has been its effects on prevailing views about
vertical integration between generation service and transmission and distribution services. The initial
"model" that guided PURPA envisioned utilities continuing to own and operate the bulk of the
existing and new generation resources. QFs, it was thought, would be largely fringe suppliers. As
it turned out, the supply of QF capacity was larger than had been anticipated, the need for new
generating capacity significantly lower than anticipated, and unexpected low natural gas prices and
the associated heavy reliance on CCGT technology significantly reduced utility advantages associated
with building and operating large coal and nuclear units. QFs with long term contracts with utilities
were also able to finance their plants with a lot more debt than utilities could utilize, reducing the
private after tax costs of financing these facilities. 3" As a result, utilities were increasingly in a
position where they were facing quantitatively significant tradeoffs between building their own
generating facilities or buying from QFs. Complaints about conflicts of interest and abusive self-
dealing began to be raised. Most importantly, as the QF business grew, industry analysts and the
obvious interest groups began to argue that the supplies of non-utility generation should not be
limited to QFs, with their technology, fuel, and size limitations," but should be opened up to all
potential suppliers of generation resources. It was argued further that utilities could play the most
effective role as "portfolio managers" for their retail customers by carefully examining the attributes
of all sources of generation -QFs, non-QF independent power producers (IPPs), third-party utility
supplies, as well as utility-owned generation - choosing the mix of power by contract and vertical
integration that was "least cost." The associated costs of power would be passed along to retail
36Obviously, these plants are being financed partially off of the balance sheets of the utilities that sign the
long term contracts. The lower financing costs are largely an illusion since the costs of utility financing rise
to reflect the increased liability associated with the long term contracts.
"'Although many suppliers were able to develop projects that met PURPA's technical requirements, but
not its spirit. These facilities were known as "PURPA machines."
customers served by the utility-buyer on an exclusive basis in much the same way as would the costs
of utility-owned generation.
Thus, by the late 1980s, the traditional view of vertically integrated utilities providing for
their retail customers' needs by owning and operating generation, transmission, and distribution
facilities was under serious attack. Competition at the wholesale level to meet a utility's incremental
generation needs was becoming widely accepted. The benefits of vertical integration were being
questioned and the potential for relying more on power by contract purchased in competitive
wholesale markets where QFs, IPPs, and utilities with excess capacity could compete to supply a
utilities incremental generation needs was attracting increased attention. Interest in regulatory
reforms to encourage entry of QFs and IPPs was growing, as were concerns about potential self-
dealing problems between a utility as buyer of generation resources from others and the utility as a
supplier of competing generation through the construction of new facilities.
c. FERC's Market Based Pricing Initiatives
The development of competitive wholesale generation markets in which all generation sources
could compete faced a number of regulatory barriers. First, unlike QFs covered by PURPA, sales
by IPPs or by utilities with excess capacity were subject to FERC regulation under the Federal Power
Act. FERC required prices, especially for sales from a specific facility, to be "cost justified." This
in turn meant that the prices charged would have to adhere to traditional cost of service/rate of return
principles. These ratemaking principles were consistent with regulating a utility serving a legal
monopoly franchise and subject to a prudent investment standard. However, they were not
compatible with the kind of take and pay incentive contracts upon which QFs increasingly relied or
on speculative market entry by IPPs.3
In 1988, FERC began to reconsider its pricing regulations in an effort to encourage entry of
non-QF IPPs into the electricity sector, as well as to encourage utilities with excess capacity to sell
3These pricing principles are more compatible with very long term take or pay contracts of the type that
characterized the few "independent" generating facilities that were operating in the U.S. prior to PURPA.
23
it to third parties under long term contracts." Specifically the policy staff and ultimately the
Commission wanted to develop regulations that would effectively allow suppliers without significant
market power to sell generation services to utilities at "market based rates" that were not tied
administratively to the supplier's accounting cost of service.4  That is, the prices for sales by
generators without market power would be deregulated (or alternatively that the market would be
relied upon to ensure that the resulting prices were "just and reasonable").
The evolution of FERC's market-based pricing rules has focused on three sets of interrelated
issues. First, whether the supplier has significant market power in the supply of various generation
product markets."4 Second, whether the supplier is able to exploit relationships with a regulated
electric utility to cross-subsidize the cost of sales or to otherwise favor an affiliated supplier. Third,
whether the supplier has market power over the provision of transmission service in the relevant
market where the power transactions took place.
In evaluating generation market power FERC has looked at the number of bidders offering
to supply in competitive solicitations, the market share of the supplier for various generation
services, and ease of entry. Market shares depend on the geographic market in which competition
is assumed to take place, which in turn depends on the availability of transmission service.
FERC's concerns about cross-subsidization and self-dealing have meant that applications for
market-based pricing by utilities and utility affiliates are given special scrutiny. Evidence
demonstrating that adequate cost accounting and cost-separations between regulated utility activities
and unregulated sales of generation must be presented to the Commission. Transactions involving
19In 1988 FERC issued three controversial Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPRs) that dealt with
wholesale power and transmission service pricing as well as the regulatory treatment of independent power
producers. FERC never issued final rules following the comments and controversy over these NOPRs.
However, it subsequently proceeded de facto to implement many of the policies contained in the NOPRs
through case by case rulings on filings presented to the Commission.
40A good summary of the evolution of FERC's policies regarding market based pricing prior to the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 can be found in B. Tennenbaum and S. Henderson, "The History of Market-Based
Pricing," The Electricity Journal, December 1991.
41FERC has focused on the seller's "unilateral" market power rather than whether the overall market as
oligopolistic leading to prices significantly above some reasonable benchmark competitive level.
sales of power at market-based rates by a generation supplier to an affiliated regulated utility would
require a showing that no preference could be given to the affiliated supplier. I am not aware of any
"self-dealing" transactions at market-based rates that have been approved by FERC, however.
Finally, utilities seeking to make sales of generation service at market-based rates must also
demonstrate that they cannot exercise market power through their control over transmission facilities.
As I will discuss further in the next section, prior to the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992,
FERC has used its authority to grant market-based pricing treatment as a lever to get utilities to
provide "open access" to their transmission systems.42 FERC has not, in fact, developed a coherent
methodology to evaluate whether a utility supplier of generation service can actually exercise market
power in downstream generation markets as a consequence of its control over regulated upstream
transmission service. Rather it has simply assumed that a utility that operates any transmission
facilities at all has market power even if there are competing sources of transmission service to
support transactions in the relevant market. As I will discuss presently, FERC used the carrot of
market-based pricing to get utilities to "voluntarily" provide access to competing suppliers to use
their transmission systems to make sales to wholesale customers.
As FERC's market-based pricing regulations have evolved, independent power producers and
unregulated utility-affiliates making power sales remote from their affiliated regulated utility retail
service territory have had little difficulty obtaining market-based pricing authority from FERC.
FERC has also accommodated the entry of power brokers which have sought to enter the market to
arrange power transactions between one of more sellers of power and specific purchasing utilities
with a minimum of regulatory obligations. On the other hand, utilities and utility affiliates seeking
market based pricing authority to sell in or near their service areas must provide adequate "open
access" transmission service to other buyers and sellers. As discussed further below, the nature of
the services that must be provided to satisfy FERC's open access criteria have expanded significandy
in the last year or so as FERC began to implement its responsibilities under the Energy Policy Act
of 1992 (EPAct92).
" Recall that prior to this law, FERC had only limited authority to order utilities to provide transmisson
service to third parties.
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By 1991, FERC had been largely successful in removing federal regulatory barriers to the
entry of independent power producers that were not QFs under PURPA. In this way, it created
opportunities for buyers to seek competitive bids from such entities and for these entities to build
facilities to supply power to willing buyers. However, FERC had absolutely no authority to force
utilities to purchase electricity from non-QF independent power suppliers or from other utilities with
excess capacity. Unlike QFs under PURPA, there was no federal requirement to purchase from
these entities. For most utilities, generation resource procurement regulations governing what a
utility builds or contracts for is subject to state rather than federal jurisdiction.43 And the
enthusiasm of the states for encouraging utilities to rely on all-source competitive procurement
arrangements to choose the lowest cost supplier regardless of ownership arrangements has varied
widely. States like New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Florida have encouraged utilities to take
an "all source" competitive procurement perspective. However, many other states have been more
cautious about moving further away from the traditional vertical integration model. Even California
included only QFs in its most recent solicitation for generating capacity.
d. FERC's Initiatives to Increase Access to Wholesale Transmission Service Prior to
EPAct92
A potential impediment to the development of a fully competitive wholesale market was
restrictions on the availability of transmission and related network services owned and controlled by
vertically integrated utilities. For a utility buyer and a generation seller to consummate a transaction.
transmission service, interconnection, control and dispatching services had to be provided. This was
not a serious problem when the supplier was a QF or IPP located in the buyer's control area as long
as the buyer was interested in consummating the purchase. However, a supplier of generation
services required transmission and related network services from other utilities if its generating plant
was located outside the purchasing utility's control area. Under the Federal Power Act, however.
FERC could not order a utility to provide interstate transmission services or related network services
43Procurement decisions by some affiliates of public utility holding companies may be FERC or S•~'
jurisdictional, however.
or to build facilities to support such a transaction. While FERC could regulate the prices charged
for transmission service, and in this way control monopoly pricing for transmission, there was
concern that "intervening" utilities would deny service or limit the services available to competing
suppliers of generation service so that they could protect their markets for wholesale power supplied
by their own generation facilities by restricting competition. The potential problems here were
compounded by the balkanization of the interconnected networks with pieces owned and operated by
many different utilities in most regions since an economical transaction could involve several control
areas on end to end or parallel paths between the generation source and the load.
The FERC staff wanted utilities to provide "open access" to their transmission system to all
third party buyers and sellers based on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. However, it had
no authority to order utilities to provide such services. Absent statutory authority to require utilities
to provide non-discriminatory transmission service, FERC began to use a carrot and stick approach
to encourage utilities to "voluntarily" file open access transmission tariffs. In particular, FERC
began to condition its approval of mergers between vertically integrated utilities on their filing of
open access transmission tariffs." As discussed earlier FERC also began to tie the availability of
"market based pricing" to utilities to their making "voluntary" open access transmission filings.
Prior to EPAct92, an adequate open access tariff provided firm and non-firm point to point service
at cost-based rates. As I will discuss presently, FERC's view of what services must be included in
an acceptable open access tariff has expanded over time.
This carrot and stick approach did lead a number of utilities to file open access transmission
tariffs. However, this approach had its limitations. While merger activity in the electric power
industry has increased significantly in the last few years, it has not yet become a merger wave. In
addition, the value of market-based pricing authority was not very large to many utilities because
"For example, the merger of Pacific Power and Light and Utah Power and Light (1989) and merger
involving Northeast Utilities and Public Service Company of New Hampshire (1991). The argument was that
the mergers created or enhanced market power in one or more markets and that by offering to provide "open
access" transmission service to third parties mitigated such market power. More recently, FERC has been
willing to waive a hearing on market power issues if the parties have an approved open access transmission
tariff in place. For example, the merger of Entergy and Gulf States Utilities (1993) and the merger of Public
Service of Indiana (PSI) and Cincinnati Gas and Electric (1994).
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existing FERC regulations gave utilities significant pricing flexibility in transactions with other
vertically integrated utilities.
Another impediment to voluntary provision of transmission service has been the regulatory
rules governing how transmission and control area services are priced. Just as was the case for
generation, utilities generally built transmission capacity to serve the needs of their retail franchise
customers. They sold transmission capacity to third parties on a firm and non-firm basis when
capacity was available from transmission facilities that were not fully utilized to serve the needs of
these customers. Moreover, utilities had few financial incentives to offer transmission service to
third parties. The costs of transmission facilities were included in the utility's rate base and the
associated capital and operating costs included in retail rates. When a utility made sales to third
parties, the bulk of the revenues received were (de facto) eventually credited back against retail rates.
Moreover, FERC placed a ceiling on the price that a utility could charge for transmission service
to third parties equal to the average embedded cost of transmission facilities per Mw of system peak
load. The service was generally point to point, but the price did not vary with the location of the
load or the generator. When the revenues calculated for the transmission transaction exceeded the
full "incremental costs" of the transaction, offering the service could reduce retail rates (slightly)
and, through the workings of regulatory lag, perhaps yield some profit to the transmitting utility.
When transmission service involved constrained paths, the full incremental costs of the transaction
could exceed the revenues produced from the transaction, providing the service would lead retail
rates to rise. Moreover, because construction of new transmission facilities has become more and
more difficult due to environmental opposition, utilities are reluctant to offer transmission capacity
that is temporarily excess to their needs to third parties on a long term basis. The political and
regulatory costs of building major new transmission facilities are perceived to be larger than the
revenues gained from selling off some temporarily excess transmission capacity.
By 1990, FERC's transmission pricing rules were widely recognized as being seriously
deficient from an efficiency, incentive, and equity perspective. In the Pennsylvania Electric case
FERC defined a new pricing rule. 45 Utilities could charge the higher of embedded cost or
incremental cost and, as a result, would not be penalized for, or provide subsidies to third parties
requesting transmission service. However, FERC provided little guidance regarding how the relevant
incremental costs should be calculated. FERC's pricing rules have been criticized by transmitting
utilities for providing inadequate compensation for the use of common network facilities when the
transactions requires expansion of a constrained interconnection. They have been criticized by
transmission dependent utilities as requiring excessive payments. They have been criticized by
academics for ignoring completely the most basic economic principles that should guide transmission
service pricing to promote the efficient location and use of generating facilities and the efficient
expansion of transmission facilities." Despite these criticisms, FERC continues to rely on this
"higher of" rule.
FERC now appears to recognize that, especially in light of its expanded authority under the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (see below), transmission pricing reforms are likely to be desirable to
support expanded competitive opportunities in wholesale markets. FERC recently initiated a
proceeding to examine alternative pricing concepts and a policy paper based on the comments
received in this proceeding is due out in Fall 1994.' However, at this point it appears that FERC
is reluctant to mandate any specific "innovative" transmission pricing methodology, or even to
encourage individual utilities to come forward with their own pricing proposals. Instead, FERC is
encouraging the formation of Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs) which will take responsibility
for regional planning of transmission facilities, the provision of information about transmission
capacity and costs, and ultimately comprehensive pricing of transmission service within the relevant
4"58 FERC 61,278 (1992)
6Joskow (1993a), Hogan (1993), and Hunt and Shuttleworth (1993).
47Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for Transmission Services Provided by Public
Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. RM93-19-000.
June 30, 1993. Technical Conference held April 8 and 15, 1994.
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regions.48 These regional groups could, in principle, help to solve the problems associated with
the balkanization of the regional networks. Again FERC is taking a carrot and stick approach. It
wants RTGs to better coordinate the parties that own interconnected generation and transmission
facilities in each region. The carrot is that FERC will give more deference to innovative pricing
proposals that come from an RTG composed of a broad cross-section of the IOU, municipal utility
and non-utility generation interests in the region. The RTGs that have been announced to date,
however, have not attempted to deal with transmission pricing issues and FERC's view that it can
avoid getting into the difficult details of transmission and control area service pricing is of
questionable merit.
e. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct92)
By 1990, the forces unleashed by PURPA and FERC's initiatives on market based pricing
and independent power producers49 had led those interested in exploiting the associated competitive
market opportunities to seek relief from the statutory restrictions on the entry of IPPs. The initial
stimulus for statutory reforms came from utilities and non-utilities which were interested in getting
into the (non-QF) IPP business in the U.S. and abroad. In order to do so, they required changes in
the Public Utility Holding Company Act that would make it possible to enter the IPP business
through a holding company structure without triggering regulation under the Act. Such regulation
effectively precluded non-utilities from entering the generation business and restricted the ability of
utilities to do so. Basically, they sought an exemption from the Act's regulatory requirements that
would otherwise have been triggered merely as a consequence of ownership of an IPP-type
generating facility;.- They also sought repeal of PUHCA's restrictions on ownership of foreign
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups.
July 30, 1993.
49FERC had also issues regulations that reduced the administrative burdens placed on true independent
power producers.
'Existing registered holding companies also wanted changes in the Act that would allow them to deelop
IPP in areas outside of the regions where they presently operated and associated system integranion
requirements.
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utility assets. The initial efforts for statutory reform focused on getting a narrowly focused
amendment to PUHCA.
Many of the opponents of PUHCA reform where also utilities. The proposed reforms were
controversial within the industry because of concerns that once the fairly narrow reforms were taken
up by Congress, various interest groups would use the legislative process as an opportunity to make
other changes in PUHCA and the Federal Power Act that many utilities would find to be of concern.
In particular, there was fairly widespread concern within the industry that a modest reform initiative
that focused on further development of IPPs and competitive wholesale generation markets would
undermine the existing vertically integrated structure of the industry, make it more difficult for
utilities to own and operate generating facilities used to serve their retail customers, facilitate
municipalization of IOU distribution franchises, and lead to changes in FERC's transmission
authority that would ultimately undermine the utility's regulated monopoly over retail customers.
Thus, opponents of reform within the IOU sector felt that the modest PUHCA reform initiative
would in fact open up a much broader initiative to restructure the electric power sector and increase
the role of competitive generation suppliers.
In fact the proposals for PUHCA reform stimulated various interest groups to push for other
reforms as well. Of particular importance were the efforts by independent power producers,
municipal utilities, and industrial customers to obtain changes in the Federal Power Act that would
expand FERC's authority to order wheeling service upon request by a wholesale or retail customer.
Independent power interests, in particular, argued that they could not compete fairly with utilities
in the wholesale market without access to transmission facilities made available based on reasonable
terms and conditions. Thus, both the removal of regulatory barriers to ownership of IPPs and the
increased availability of transmission service soon became linked together as being important
components of policies to expand competitive wholesale market opportunities.
When the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was finally passed by the Congress in October 1992"
it included changes in the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act that
"•P.L. 102-486, Title VII, October 24, 1992.
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removed PUHCA's barriers to utilities and non-utilities having ownership interests in independent
power producers, removed PUHCA's restrictions on U.S. utilities owning electric utility assets in
other countries, and expanded FERC's authority to order utilities to provide wheeling service to
support wholesale power transactions.
It is important to understand that EPAct92 is built around the traditional model of a regulated
monopoly distribution company that has the exclusive right to serve retail customers within its
franchise area. The utility in turn retains an obligation to serve all of these customers economically
and reliably at prices regulated by a state commission. However, EPAct92 recognizes explicitly the
potential benefits of encouraging utilities to meet this obligation to serve by considering all generation
supply options, including purchases from competing third-party suppliers of generation services
pursuant to incentive contracts rather than cost of service regulation. It recognizes further that
efforts to create a competitive wholesale market in which utilities would have the opportunity to shop
to meet the needs of their retail customers, and where competing generation suppliers could compete
fairly to supply these needs, would accrue to the benefit of consumers.
To support the realization of this model of the utility sector, EPAct92 creates a new class of
electricity generators called "Exempt Wholesale Generators" (EWG) whose owners and operators
are exempt from the provisions of PUHCA that had created significant barriers to utility and non-
utility entry into the IPP business. An EWG is defined as an entity engaged directly or indirectly
through one or more affiliates exclusively in the business of owning or operating facilities engaged
exclusively in producing electricity for sale at wholesale .2
EPAct92 also amended the Federal Power Act to expand greatly FERC's authority to order
utilities to provide transmission (wheeling) service to support wholesale power transactions."
Buyers and sellers are now free to petition FERC to order transmitting utilities to provide wheeling
service, even if meeting such requests requires the transmitting utility to expand its facilities. FERC
in turn is to establish pricing regulations that promote the efficient generation and transmission of
52P.L. 102-486, Section 711.
S3P.L. 102-486, Section 721.
electricity and that allow utilities to recover the full economic cost of the transmission service
provided. In response to utility concerns about retail wheeling, EPAct92 includes a specific
provision that limits FERC's authority to order wheeling to support wholesale power transactions
only, thus making it clear that FERC has no authority to order a utility to wheel power to a retail
customer.
The initial implementation of EPAct 1992 coincided with the transfer of executive branch
power to the new Clinton Administration and its subsequent appointment of four new FERC
commissioners. The new Commission has made a concerted effort to implement the pro-competitive
provisions of EPAct92 quickly. On the EWG front, the Commission issued regulations governing
certification and regulatory requirements for EWGs that make it easy for such entities to obtain the
necessary certifications and to be subject to minimal regulatory reporting requirements. Ironically,
however, the EWG provisions of EPAct92 have had relatively little impact so far on entry into and
expansion of the independent generating sector. This reflects several factors. First, there is
substantial excess generating capacity in many parts of the U.S., so that there has been little demand
so far for new generating facilities that might be supplied by EWGs. Second, EPAct92 did not
repeal PURPA's requirements for utilities to purchase from QFs, so that QFs continue to have a
slight advantage. Third, many states still do not have planning and procurement regulations that
explicitly require utilities to take all potential sources into account when they make long term
generation supply decisions. Nevertheless, a number of QFs under construction have changed their
status to EWGs and new suppliers no longer are forced to structure projects so that they meet
PURPA's QF criteria in order to avoid PUHCA regulatory problems. As capacity needs emerge
once again and state generation procurement policies adapt to the new vision of procurement in a
competitive wholesale market, opportunities for EWGs should grow.
EPAct92 did have a very major impact of the participation of U.S. utility holding companies
in the development of independent power facilities in other countries and in the privatization of
electric utilities around the world. In just two years a significant number of U.S. utilities have
invested significant funds in foreign utility ventures.
Probably the most important domestic impacts of EPAct92 to date have been associated with
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FERC's efforts to use EPAct92 to expand transmission access opportunities for wholesale buyers and
sellers. Among the most important policies that FERC has adopted are:
1. FERC has required utilities to publish detailed information about the availability of
transmission capacity on their systems and related operating characteristics of their bulk
power facilities.54
2. FERC has expanded the range of transmission services that utilities must be prepared to
offer from simply point to point service to a full range of services that are "comparable" to
the services that a vertically integrate utility provides to itself. It has also required utilities
to include comparable service provisions in "voluntary" transmission service filings even
when these filings are not responses to wheeling orders by the Commission under Section
211 of the Federal Power Act. Precisely what "comparability of service" means in practice
is still evolving."
3. FERC has allowed wholesale customers to file for "generic" tariffed transmission service
even in the absence of a specific buyer and a specific seller.
4. FERC recently made it clear that its approval of market-based pricing applications and
merger applications by vertically integrated utilities will be contingent on their filing open
access transmission tariffs with comparable service provisions. Thus, FERC will no longer
go through' the charade of making a finding that specific market power concerns necessitate
"'Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Proposed New Reporting Requirements Implementing Section
213(b) of the FPA, April 15, 1993.
"NARUC Bulletin No. 22-94, May 30, 1994, page 6 (re AEP and Florida Power & Light Company)
an open access filing.s6
5. FERC has encouraged the formation of regional transmission groups (RTG) to deal with
transmission planning, operations, and pricing issues on a comprehensive regional basis."
While FERC has made significant progress on the transmission access front, it has made little
progress on the transmission and ancillary services pricing front. This is unfortunate. Appropriate
pricing has important implications for the location of new generating facilities and the use of existing
facilities. There seems to be broad recognition that pricing reforms are desirable, but the
Commission and its staff has shown little interest in taking a pro-active stance on transmission
pricing. Moreover, the sharp distinction that the Commission has drawn between the "transmission
function" and the "generation function" fails to recognize important complementarities between
generation and transmission in the provision of a full range of efficient network services. These
include dispatching, voltage and frequency control, load following, spinning reserves, settlements
of differences between contracts and actual flows, backup services, etc. These services must be
provided in an efficient wholesale market. The services must be defined, measured, and priced
properly and credibly."ss These issues are especially important in the U.S. where many transmission
owners operate portions of a synchronized AC system in which property rights are poorly defined
and associated externality and free riding problems are rampant. FERC would like to see these
67The Energy Daily, August 11, 1994, page 1 (re an application for market based pricing by Heartland
Energy Services an affiliate of Wisconsin Power & Light Company, Docket Nos. ER94-108, ER94-475)
Electric Utility Week, August 1, 1994, page 11 (re proposed merger between Central & South West and El
Paso Electric, Draft Order in Dockets EC94-7 and ER-898).
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups.
July 30, 1993.
"FERC has recognized the existence of various "ancillary" services that are provided in conjunction with
transmission service. However, it has provided little guidance for how to define or prices these services It
rejected the one litigated utility application to charge for these services that it has been presented with since
EPAct92. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Opinion No. 383 re Northern States Power Company.
Docket Nos. ER90-349-000, ER90-406-000 and ER91-21-000.
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issues handled by RTGs, but the development of RTGs has been slow and their progress in tackling
issues related to pricing and ancillary services has been even slower. In 1993 FERC conducted an
inquiry into its transmission pricing rules."9 Numerous comments were submitted and two technical
conference held in April 1994. A policy statement from FERC on transmission pricing based on this
proceedung is likely to be issued in Fall 1994.
Despite these continuing problems, it is quite clear that unintegrated or integrated utilities
which seek to meet their incremental generation needs by purchasing power from third-party
suppliers can rely on competitive wholesale markets to make such transactions. Regulatory barriers
to entry to the entry of independent power producers have largely been removed. When utilities go
out for bids for capacity and energy they routinely receive large numbers of bids from many
suppliers. Utility buyers and generation suppliers (and brokers) can get the transmission service they
need to complete bilateral transactions between a particular generator and a particular distribution
system customer. Developments in transmission access policies are likely to increase the ability of
distribution system buyers to integrate efficiently multiple generating sources and to trade more
actively in short term energy and capacity markets even if they do not operate their own transmission
systems.
It is important to recognize, however, that the wholesale market that has evolved in the U.S.
has some very special characteristics that are quite different from the markets that have been created
in, for example, England and Wales. The wholesale market is built upon the backbone of vertically
integrated utilities that operate over 140 control areas in cooperation with neighboring control areas
which are part of the same synchronous systems. Despite extensive entry of QFs and IPPs in the
last decade, they make up less than 10% of the energy produced and are largely non-dispatchable
facilities that feed energy to their host utilities. The control areas bear the responsibilities for
balancing loads and resources, maintaining frequency and voltage, providing spinning reserves.
dispatching in response to transmission constraints, providing emergency support, and coordinaung
operations with interconnected control areas. The costs of providing these services are borne almost
"'Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for
Transmission Services Provided by Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, June 30, 1993.
entirely by control areas and their franchise customers as well. Numerous bilateral and multilateral
agreements and contracts are in place to affect this coordination and to make it possible to "move"
power from sellers in one control area to buyers in another control area. Furthermore, the actual
trade in the wholesale market is built upon a bilateral "wheeling model" which assumes that
electricity actually moves from a specific generator to a specific load over a specific contract path
defined over specific pieces of the transmission network and ignores the actual physical properties
of a synchronized AC system. Most of the trades in the wholesale market continue to be associated
with capacity that is temporarily excess to the needs of integrated utilities. New generation resources
brought into the system are either owned by utilities or are supported by long term take and pay
contracts. A "speculative entry" market for new generating facilities does not yet exist.
These wholesale market arrangements have worked and are working reasonably well to
govern primarily transactions between interconnected vertically integrated control area operators who
are not in competition with one another for the bulk of their revenues. It has been able to
accommodate the entry of QFs relatively easily because most of them sell power to the control area
operator where they are located and are non-dispatchable facilities. The efficacy of these rules
depends on cooperation between control area operators, the relatively small number of buyers and
sellers that participate in the market and the viability of the contractual fiction that power flows from
a particular buyer to a particular seller along a particular contract path. The firm capacity/non-firm
energy contract paradigm, the ability to monitor compliance with it, and extensive reciprocity in the
provision of control area services between control area operators have been critical for allowing this
market to function economically and reliability.
The rules that govern the operation of wholesale market in the U.S. have numerous
imperfections, however. They have proven to be especially problematical to apply to small
municipal utilities that now rely on competitive wholesale market purchases for a large fraction of
their needs. Indeed, many of the disputes between control area operators and small municipal
utilities embedded in their systems have actually been disputes arising from cream skimming, free
riding, and the general problems associated with identifying and charging for all of the services that
are actually provided by one or more suppliers connected to the network. Loop flow and other
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problems associated with the impacts of one supplier on other interconnected suppliers have been a
continuing source of tension and dispute. These imperfections are likely to be increasingly costly
as the wholesale market expands and retail wheeling is permitted unless more fundamental changes
in industry structure, transmission and control area service pricing, and regulation of retail rates
takes place.
RETAIL COMPETITION
The evolution of competition in the U.S. electric power sector has occurred within a model
in which utilities continue to have the exclusive right to serve retail customers within specific
geographic areas. That is, they have a monopoly to sell electricity to the public within a specific
geographic area. In return for that right utilities have taken on an obligation to plan for their
customers' needs and to make investments in generating facilities or enter into power contracts with
third parties to meet these needs economically and reliably. Utility planning, resource acquisition
and prices are also subject to state commission regulation. The provisions affecting electric utilities
in EPAct92 (both those discussed above and numerous provisions affecting utility planning, energy
conservation, and renewable energy) were based on this model as well.
Of course, the fact. that utilities have a legal monopoly to sell electricity at retail does not
mean that they face no competition. Large industrial customers can turn to cogeneration and self-
generation and these options have been facilitated by PURPA and EPAct92. Municipalization is an
option in many areas of the country, although we have seen relatively little municipalization activity
in the U.S. since the 1950s, and much of the municipalization that took place earlier was stimulated
by the availability of tax free financing to municipalities and preferential access to federal
hydroelectric power. EPAct92 facilitates municipalization by making it easier for potential municipal
utilities to obtain a wide range of transmission service that makes it possible for them to gain access
to the wholesale generation market and to integrate diverse generation sources with only modest
transmission expenses. Indeed, although the stimulus from the transmission access provisions in
EPAct92 came largely from QF/IPP interests seeking to expand their market opportunities, most of
FERC's activity on the transmission pricing front has been in response to requests from municipal
utilities for expanded transmission services."
The most important development in the public policy debate about the future of the U.S.
electric power industry is associated with reforming the basic model of a monopoly supplier of
electricity at retail responsible for "bundling" economical and reliable electricity supplies for its retail
customers, relying on generation service supplied either from the utility's own facilities or under
contract from third parties. Industrial customers in particular, as well as some IPP developers, have
begun to promote a "retail wheeling" model in which the local utility would be required to unbundle
transmission, distribution, and generation services and provide access to the wholesale market for
retail customers who preferred to arrange for their own supplies in a competitive market. This
alternative model is based on the same basic principles that have governed the restructuring of the
electricity sector in England and Wales and the restructuring of the natural gas and
telecommunications sectors in the U.S. Competitive services (e.g. generation) are to be separated
from natural monopoly services (e.g. transmission and distribution) and these services made available
and priced on an unbundled basis to retail customers. Retail wheeling customers are guaranteed
access to the natural monopoly services at regulated rates so that they can shop among competing
suppliers for the competitive services. As the utility's monopoly over the competitive services is
removed so to is its obligation to plan for and supply its retail customers with these services at
regulated rates.
The standard conceptualization of how retail customers would gain access to the competitive
wholesale generation market reflects the current structure of the electric power industry and the
bilateral contract/wheeling framework that has grown up around wholesale power transactions
between electric utilities.6' A retail customer would contract for generation service with one or
more remote generating companies. The customer would then contract with its host utility and any
60A variety of other economic factors have also increased incentives for municipalization. These factors
are largely the same as those that have stimulated an interest in retail wheeling, a subject which I now turn
to.
6'Although proponents of retail wheeling have generally failed to specify a comprehensive model of how
all of the pieces would fit together.
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intervening utilities to provide transmission and control area services. The remote generating
company would contract with its host control area operator for interconnection and dispatch services.
The customer's host utility would provide backup service or partial requirements service to settle
differences between what the customer takes from the system and what the third party generation
suppliers it has contracted with deliver to the system. In essence, the retail customer is
conceptualized in the same way as a municipal distribution company in terms of its relationship with
the host utility and remote suppliers. This is not likely to be a sound framework in which to create
an efficient electricity sector in which retail customers are responsible for making their own
arrangements for electricity supplies in a competitive bulk power market. Major institutional reforms
designed specifically to accommodate efficient competition need to be undertaken to support such a
fully competitive system.
Why has there been so much pressure for expanding opportunities for retail wheeling in the
last two years or so? Certainly all of the discussion of wholesale market competition surrounding
EPAct92 created an environment in which the appropriate boundaries between competition and
regulation would naturally be subject to ongoing debate. The experience in other countries, in
particularly England and Wales, has been important as well. Its proponents argue that it has
demonstrated that an electric power sector that departs from the traditional bundled franchise
monopoly model and relies more on competition at wholesale and customer choice of suppliers at
retail could work reasonably well if the appropriate industry structure and supporting market and
regulatory institutions were in place and, more importantly, that it could help to promote efficiency
improvements and lower prices.
However, the primary factor stimulating the interest in retail wheeling by large industrial
customers is not credible evidence that there are huge short run or long run efficiency gains that can
be achieved in the U.S. electric power sector. Many proponents of retail wheeling assert that very
large improvements in efficiency will be achieved quickly, that rates could fall significantly if these
efficiency gains are passed through as lower prices, and that utility investments and contractual
commitments can be protected from significant financial losses. However, little if any crediile
evidence exists to support this "something for everyone" scenario. The evidence on efficiencv
improvements (but not price reductions) in the electricity sector in England and Wales since
privatization and restructuring is certainly impressive. Unfortunately, it is not very relevant to the
U.S. The performance attributes of the pre-1990 system in England and Wales were much poorer
than they are today in the U.S. Indeed labor productivity in the U.S. electricity sector is still much
better than in the UK. Moreover, labor costs account for only 12% of the price of electricity in the
U.S. The average performance of U.S. generating plants today is certainly no worse than in England
and Wales despite significant improvements in nuclear plant performance in England and Wales since
1990. Nor does the U.S. have the "coal problem" that was of concern to the Thatcher government.
This is not to say that there is not room for efficiency improvements in the U.S. electricity sector.
But rather that the U.S. sector starts off from a very different point on the productivity frontier than
did the England and Wales system. Furthermore, regulatory and competitive constraints have
induced U.S. utilities to undertake major cost reduction programs over the last few years. In my
opinion, the major efficiencies associated with the introduction of retail wheeling will be associated
with the choice, construction costs, and operating performance of new generating resources and the
effectiveness of competition in undermining the politicization of utility resource procurement.
While the rhetoric of large short run efficiency improvements dominates the discussion of
both wholesale and retail competition, the primary actual motivation for retail wheeling (and
municiplalization) today is the fact that in many parts of the U.S. the cost of generation services
embedded in the bundled regulated rates that customers pay is significantly higher than the current
price of generation services available in the wholesale market. In some areas of the country the
difference between the embedded cost of generation and QF contracts and the wholesale price of
generation service is 2 to 3 cents/kWh. The largest gaps are in California, the Northeast, and a few
other areas scattered around the country. Table 2 displays estimates of the embedded cost of
generation included in retail rates in different areas of the country. These costs vary widely by
region. More importantly, in some areas of the country these embedded costs are significantly larger
than the short run price of power in the wholesale market (2 to 3 cents/kWh) and/or the long run
cost of power in the wholesale market (4 to 5 cents/kWh). The primary actual stimulus for retail
wheeling today is the possibility that it may provide a mechanism for some customers to avoid
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paying for the full embedded cost of the generation capacity and power contract liability that utilities
have on their books that have been permitted by regulators to be included in regulated electricity
rates.
Why is the cost of generation service embedded in retail rates so much higher than the
prevailing wholesale market price for generation services in some areas of the U.S.? It is because
there is a large gap between the total costs utilities have incurred to supply electricity and the
marginal cost of supplying electricity, at least in the short run. And it is the marginal cost which
determines prices in the wholesale market. There are several reasons why this gap between total
costs and marginal costs has emerged
1. The U.S. added nearly 100,000 Mw of nuclear capacity during the 1970s and 1980s.
This capacity was built under the assumption that fossil fuel prices would continue to rise and to
reach very high levels by the end of the century. These facilities cost much more than anticipated
to build, cost much more to operate, and operate at lower levels of reliability than had been
anticipated. The average total cost of nuclear facilities is frequently significantly higher than the
current price of electricity in the wholesale market or the projected cost of new CCGT facilities.
While the incremental cost of many nuclear facilities make it economical to continue operating them
given the short run and long run costs of alternatives, some nuclear facilities are probably not
economical to continue running even on an incremental cost basis.
2. There is substantial excess generating capacity in many parts of the U.S. as a consequence
of slow demand growth and rapid expansion of QF capacity. The price of generation services in the
wholesale market reflects this excess capacity situation and is often below the long run marginal cost
of expansion. In areas like California, additional generating capacity does not appear to be needed
until well into the next century.
3. Utilities in some areas of the country (especially California and the Northeast) where
required to purchase too much QF capacity at too high a price under long term take and pay
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contracts. Part of the problem results from bad luck in forecasting future capacity needs and future
fossil fuel prices. However, the problem is also a consequence of the politicization of the resource
acquisition process and the ability of QF interests to "capture" the regulatory process so as to
increase the demand for and price of the power produced by these facilities. Environmentalists'
interested in promoting cogeneration and renewable energy have also been an important force leading
regulators to require utilities to base resource acquisition decisions on "social cost and benefit"
criteria that lead to purchases of power that is more costly than could be sustained in a competitive
market.
4. Utility energy conservation programs that provide subsidies to customers to use electricity
more efficiently have both reduced the demand for electricity and have led to higher electricity
prices.62 A variety of other cross-subsidies are built into utility rate designs that would not be
sustainable in a competitive market.63
5. Improvements in the efficiency of CCGT technology have significantly reduced the long
run marginal cost of electricity produced using natural gas.
6. Probably the most important factor, however, is the abundant supply and very low price
of natural gas available throughout the U.S. Fifteen years ago natural gas was viewed as a very
scarce commodity whose price would rise significantly over time and which was too valuable to burn
to produce electricity." QF contracts designed by the California commission in the mid-1980s
assumed that oil and natural gas prices would rise to the equivalent of $100/barrel by the end of the
62Prices rise both to recover the utility's expenditures on energy conservation and because some of the
most aggressive conservation programs are in areas of the country where the regulated price of electricity Is
far above its marginal cost.
63e.g. special rates for low income customers, geographic price averaging, grouping of customers wnth
heterogenous load characteristics in the same rate class, etc.
'Indeed the Fuel Use Act of 1978 restricted the use of natural gas in utility boilers.
century. Instead of being too valuable to burn, natural gas has become the fuel of choice for both
economic and environmental reasons in most parts of the country. Base-load electricity from CCGT
technology can be produced for less than 4 cents/kWh in many parts of the country. QF contracts
in California require utilities to pay as much as 11 cents/kWh in capacity and energy charges,
however, and the average QF contract calls for payments above 7 cents/kWh.
It is of course politically attractive to portray the gap between wholesale market prices and
utility generation costs as an indicator of utility operating inefficiency and that if customers could
purchase in the wholesale market they could obtain low cost electricity that utilities are "blocking"
from coming into the system. This is nonsense. The gap reflects the sunk costs of generating
facility investment and QF contract commitments made in the past based on assumptions about
economic conditions that have not be realized and which regulators have allowed utilities to include
in their prices. On an operating cost basis utilities use the wholesale market to acquire as much
energy and capacity as they can as long as the cost of those purchases is less than or equal to the
utilities avoided costs. Utilities may not fully optimize on this dimension, but no study has found
sufficient short run cost savings from more aggressive purchases from the short term and medium
term energy markets to support large and rapid price reductions. If there are significant efficiency
gains to be made from enhanced competition they likely to be associated largely with investments
in new generating facilities and improvements in the availability of existing generating units.
The debate about retail wheeling is then largely a debate about who will pay for the sunk
generation and QF contract costs that account for the gap between the embedded cost of generation
supplied by utilities on a bundled basis and the price (marginal cost) of generation services on the
wholesale market. This is generally referred to as the "stranded cost" problem. Utilities. not
terribly enthusiastic about competition to begin with, are very much opposed to retail wheeling unless
some credible mechanism can be found to provide for transition arrangements to pay for these
stranded costs. Industrial customers and some of those who hope to make sales to them want the
utilities' shareholders to pay for a large fraction of these costs. Representatives of small retail
customer interests have opposed retail wheeling because they are concerned that the burden of
stranded costs will be shifted to "captive customers" who will be unable to take advantage of retail
competition opportunities.
It has also become a debate about how we conceptualize the role of private utilities in our
society. Environmentalists have generally opposed retail wheeling because they have been able to
use the monopoly franchise "utility as portfolio managers" model to provide subsidies for energy
conservation and renewables that either could not be sustained in a competitive market or would have
to be recovered from customers in different and more visible ways. More generally, private utilities
in the U.S. have also traditionally taken on a quasi-public role in providing various services and
supporting various social programs that we would not ordinarily find firms in competitive markets
to find attractive. Some opponents of retail wheeling want to maintain the utility as an entity that
has a "public service obligation fulfilled with private sector efficiency." Many proponents of retail
wheeling see it as an opportunity to get utilities out of the "taxation by regulation business" and
focusing their attention on producing electricity as a commodity as cheaply as they can.
The debate about retail wheeling is now taking place primarily at the state level, although
FERC is likely to end up playing an important role in determining how it all turns out. Issues
associated with expanding retail wheeling opportunities are being considered or have been considered
by the public utility commissions in California, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Michigan.
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Illinois. Legislative initiatives have taken place or are underway in
a number of other states including Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio.
By and large the states have taken a fairly cautious approach to retail wheeling initiatives.
The Connecticut Commission decided not to proceed with retail wheeling at this time arguing that
it raised a number of complex issues which had to be resolved for it to work fairly and efficiently.
that it would undermine utility initiatives affecting energy efficiency and the environment, that
stranded cost issues were difficult to resolve, and that the primary efficiencies from retail wheeling
would not emerge until new generation resources were needed." The Commission decided that
retail wheeling is not presently in the public interest. A task force created by the governor of
Massachusetts, which included representatives from the public utility commission also identified a
sDPUC Investigation into Retail Electric Transmission Service, Docket No. 93-09-29, Draft Decision.
August 5, 1994.
long set of issues associated with retail wheeling and concluded that it requires further study.'
The Michigan Commission saw both potential costs and potential benefits associated with retail
wheeling. It is putting in place a modest experiment to begin when new resources are required to
help to resolve a long list of issues it identified.67 The New York Commission recently began a
study of retail wheeling and has indicated that it is approaching this issue with "extreme caution."6"
The most extensive examination of the structure and regulation of the electric utility industry
and the future role of competition is taking place presently in California. In April 1994, the
California Commission issued a report (known as the "Blue Book") which laid out a set of major
proposed structural and regulatory reforms for the electric power sector, including a phased in
schedule for retail wheeling (called "direct access").6 The Blue Book proposals include the
introduction of Performance Based Regulation to replace traditional cost-of-service/rate of return
regulation, unbundling of generation from transmission/distribution services, retail wheeling, and a
Competition Transition Charge (CTC) to allow utilities to recover the "uneconomic" portion of their
embedded generation costs and QF contract obligations through some type of unspecified surcharge
on transmission, backup, or interconnection services. The process that has followed the issuance of
the Blue Book has attracted participants from all over the country and has been quite contentious.
While most participants have accepted the concept of "customer choice" through retail wheeling,
there are wide differences in views about when and how it should be done, who should pay for
stranded costs, and how these costs should be recovered. Major differences of opinion have also
emerged regarding the institutional changes required to support a fully competitive electricity sector.
Two of the utilities in California have argued that the creation of a regional pooling/grid operation
mechanism similar to that in the England and Wales system is a necessary precondition to allowing
66Massachusetts Division of Energy Resources, Electric Utility Market Reform Task Force Report, July
1994.
67Re Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity, Michigan Public Service Commission, 1994.
"Energy Daily, Volume 22, No. 155, p. 1, 1994.
6Proposed Policy Statement on Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming
Regulatory Policy, April 20, 1994.
retail customers to shop for their own power in a competitive market. This position has been
supported by the U.S. Department of Energy and some environmental groups. The other major
utility and large customer groups have argued that retail wheeling should simply be superimposed
on the existing bilateral contract/wheeling model that has emerged over time to support wholesale
transactions between utilities. They argue that a regional pool is unnecessary, undesirable, and
unattainable for supporting a competitive electricity sector with retail wheeling.
Those supporting a regional pool and associated wholesale market reforms have the better
of the argument. Simply superimposing extensive retail competition on a system which was not
designed to accommodate it may benefit some intermediaries who thrive on market disorganization
and high transactions costs, but it will not lead to efficient competition. More fundamental structural
reforms are required to create a system whose pieces work together to support competition taking
into account the special physical and economic attributes of electric power networks.
The California Commission is likely to come to a decision by the end of the year and what
it decides is likely to have important implications for the rest of the country.
Although FERC is precluded from requiring a utility to provide retail wheeling service,
FERC is likely to play a significant role in resolving the debate about retail wheeling. This is the
case because while FERC cannot order retail wheeling, it has asserted exclusive jurisdiction over the
rates cliarged for "interstate" transmission service.70 The availability of transmission and control
area service at prices that support the efficient location of facilities, efficient use of transmission and
distribution facilities, and efficient expansion of the transmission network is a critical component of
an efficient competitive wholesale or retail electricity market. The ball here is in FERC's court, but
FERC has so far been reluctant to play.
FERC has also started a rulemaking proceeding to determine rules for how it will deal with
70Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transm•tirnm
Utilities, Docket No. RM94-7-000, June 29, 1994.
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recovery of stranded costs associated with both wholesale and retail service. 7  To the extent that
states decide that they want to proceed with retail wheeling and provide for recovery of stranded
costs, the natural place to recover the stranded cost-related charges would be as part of the
transmission/distribution rate which customers cannot bypass since transmission and distribution
service will continue to be regulated monopoly services under most competition models. However,
FERC may have exclusive jurisdiction over these charges. The question now on the table is whether
FERC will accommodate, encourage, or refuse to allow such charges in transmission rates.
Precisely how this jurisdictional quagmire is handled can have important implications for the
direction of industry restructuring and the expansion of opportunities for competition.
ISSUES ON THE HORIZON
So far, the expansion of competitive opportunities in the U.S. electricity sector has proceeded
"incrementally" on top of an existing institutional structure composed primarily of fully vertically
integrated utilities having monopoly retail service franchise areas and subject to cost of service
regulation. Competition to date has largely been "on the margin" and virtually all existing generating
capacity is either owned by utilities and paid for via cost of service regulation formulas or supported
by long term contracts whose costs in turn are passed through to franchise monopoly customers.
These institutions were not really designed to support either a fully competitive wholesale market or
a fully competitive retail wheeling market. All of the discussion of wholesale and retail competition
has naturally led to suggestions that the entire industry and regulatory framework be restructured so
that all of the components work together well to support efficient competition where competition can
be relied upon and to promote efficient and equitable supplies of services that are not conducive to
being supplied efficiently by a competitive market and that will continue to be supplied by regulated
monopolies. The primary issues that are now beginning to be discussed more seriously as a
consequence of the interest in expanding competitive opportunities are the following:
7
"Stranded costs associated with wholesale service are not really a big issue for most utilities. However.
the Federal Appeals Court for the District of Columbia has expressed skepticism about the legality of adding
a stranded cost or transition charge to transmission service charges. See Cajun Electric Power Cooperant e
Inc. v. FERC, No. 92-1461, July 12, 1994.
1. Performance Based Regulation: There is now widespread support for reforming
traditional cost of service/rate of return regulation and replacing it or supplementing it with some
type of incentive or performance-based regulation (PBR) mechanisms such as the RPI-x+y
mechanisms used to regulate AT&T's interstate telephone rates and to regulate the prices charged
by the RECs in England and Wales. While designing good PBR mechanisms is more difficult than
the recent popular discussion suggests,72 it is a lot easier to apply these concepts to electricity when
new generation requirements are to be purchased in a competitive wholesale market and when the
technology of choice is CCGT technology rather than nuclear or large coal facilities. The
introduction of PBR mechanisms is an important component of the restructuring program proposed
in California. I expect PBR mechanisms to become a much more important component of the
electricity sector regulatory framework in the U.S. over the next few years.
2. Improving Wholesale Market Institutions: There is also growing acceptance of the view
that utilities will be required to purchase any future generation requirements to serve their franchise
customers through some type of competitive procurement protocol. Furthermore, to enhance the
efficiency of the wholesale market reforms in transmission access and pricing rules are likely to be
required and barriers created by the balkanized ownership and control of the three interconnected
AC systems in the U.S. resolved.
I expect to see a lot of pressure to create regional transmission entities and regional power
pooling and dispatch protocols. These entities would be responsible for supporting an efficient
competitive generation sector by providing non-discriminatory transmission access at prices that
reflect the real costs of providing the services, rather than contractual fictions associated with the
bilateral contract point to point wheeling model, purchasing necessary control area services to allow
the regional grid to operate economically and reliably (and passing along the associated costs to the
buyers and sellers using the transmission system), and providing for integrated dispatch,
coordination, and backup services and billing arrangements to allow for the efficient and reliable use
72See Joskow and Schmalansee (1986).
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of generating facilities. While all of the necessary relationships can, in theory, be created with a
complex web of bilateral and multilateral contracts, a regional transmission and pooling entity could
provide the necessary services more efficiently and with less litigation. It can also provide a more
visible set of market prices that can be used to write hedging and contingent financial contracts.
Finally, the creation of regional transmission and dispatch entities can solve self-dealing and
discrimination concerns associated with the continued common ownership of transmission and
distribution facilities, a subject to which I now turn.
3. Separation of Generation from Transmission: The vast bulk of the generating capacity
operating in the U.S. today is owned by utilities which rely on the energy they produce internally
to meet the needs of their franchise customers (i.e. through vertical integration). Given the relatively
slow growth rate of electricity demand, the electricity sector will remain largely vertically integrated
for many years even if all new generation is purchased from third parties. The common ownership
of transmission and generation capacity creates the opportunity for utilities to favor their own
facilities over those of competitors and to use control over transmission facilities to manipulate access
from or into proximate utility service areas by competing buyers or sellers. Precisely how serious
these problems are in the light of federal and state regulatory rules restricting such behavior is a
matter of some dispute. However, there is growing pressure on regulators to consider requiring
utilities to sell off some or all of their generating capacity to independent third parties to affect a
clear separation between the operation of the transmission network and the competitive generation
market. In addition, it is argued that such a separation would allow all generating capacity to be
subject to a market test and market incentives, not just new generating capacity as is now the case.
Some of the arguments for the separation are self-serving of course, advanced by entities that hope
to acquire these assets and operate them for a profit. Moreover, separation of the nuclear facilities
in this way may not be feasible because of their costs and risk attributes. And of course the market
value of any generation that is sold off to third parties will depend on the kind of market and
contractual arrangements that will determine the prices at which it can sell electricity. While nobody
has yet put forward a comprehensive plan for separating generation from the existing IOU structure.
it is clear that this will be a subject of lively discussion in the near future.
4. Use of the Regulated Monopoly to Pursue Social Goals: It is widely recognized that the
institution of regulated monopoly in the U.S. is used for redistributive purposes via an implicit
process of "taxation by regulation. "73 In the electricity sector, the institution of regulated monopoly
has facilitated subsidies for energy conservation, purchases of environmentally friendly but privately
costly generating technologies, research and development activities, special rates for selected groups,
and other behavior that would be difficult or impossible to sustain in a fully competitive market.74
The interest in expanding competitive opportunities, in particular the proposals for retail wheeling,
are stimulating discussions of whether utilities should continue to be used to finance and implement
the social goals associated with these programs and to identify alternative mechanisms for achieving
them that are more compatible with competition. One of the great ironies of the last year is that
California, a state that has been at the forefront of using utilities and their ratepayers to finance a
wide variety of energy efficiency, environmental, and social programs, was the first state to make
a comprehensive proposal to foster competition through retail access which will surely undermine
both the nature of these programs and the ethos that has led to them. As I discussed earlier, the
debate about retail wheeling is, in part, a debate about what policymakers expect electricity suppliers
to be doing. Is it to supply electricity as cheaply as possible, align prices with costs, and to sell as
much as they can, as would suppliers of any other commodity in a competitive market? Or should
utilities be responsible for using their regulated monopoly to help to design and finance programs
to ameliorate market imperfections associated with decisions about the use of electricity,
environmental externalities associated with the production of electricity, and other social goals? The
answer to these questions imply very different paths for the structure of the electricity sector and the
role of competition. Not surprisingly, these are questions that politicians would prefer not to address
directly and which the California proposal ducks by assuming that it can have it both ways.
"Posner 1971.
74Joskow 1993b.
5. Stranded Costs: As discussed above, a major issue that will continue to dominate the
discussion of industry restructuring and competition will be the question of who pays for the sunk
costs associated with the gap between the generation and QF contract costs utilities have included
in their retail rates and the wholesale price of electricity. A comprehensive resolution to the
technical issues associated with implementing PBR mechanisms, reforming wholesale market
institutions, unbundling and retail wheeling will not be forthcoming unless utilities can be induced
to cooperate in the industry restructuring and regulatory reforms that are on the table. They will not
cooperate fully until the stranded cost issue is resolved.
CONCLUSIONS
It seems fairly clear that the U.S. electricity sector is on a trajectory of fundamental reform.
Increased reliance on competition, at least at the wholesale level, will proceed apace. Reforms in
traditional cost-of-service regulation and more reliance on PBR mechanisms will accelerate. The
recent pressures to rethink the role of the utility in society, to expand competitive opportunities for
retail customers, and to restructure the industry so that it is specifically designed to support
competition, rather than being twisted to accommodate it, are likely to intensify. Precisely how
quickly this discussion will lead to further changes in industry structure, regulation and the expansion
of competitive opportunities at wholesale and retail is uncertain, but it is unlikely that the competitive
genie will ever get put back into the bottle. Things have moved along faster in the last couple of
years than most people thought possible and there is little doubt that competitive opportunities will
expand and regulatory and structural changes will take place to support them. It is merely a question
of time and how much pain and cost we are going to incur as we move from here to there.
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY
1992
(cents/Kwh)
Area Residential Industrial
U.S. Average 9.0 5.5
New England 11.1 8.1
New York 13.8 8.8
New Jersey 11.5 8.0
Illinois 11.8 6.1
Chicago 12.6 7.0
Michigan 8.4 6.1
Detroit 9.8 6.8
Indiana 6.9 4.3
South Atlantic 7.9 4.9
East S. Central 6.7 4.2
Arkansas 9.1 6.0
California 12.2 8.2
Oregon 5.1 3.7
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED AVERAGE EMBEDDED GENERATION COST
1992
U.S. Average
New England
New York
New Jersey
Illinois
Chicago
Michigan
Detroit
Indiana
South Atlantic
East S. Central
Arkansas
California
Oregon
Average Embedded Cost of Generation
cents/Kwh
3.8 - 4.1
6.8- 7.1
6.2- 7.2
6.4-6.7
4.2 -4.5
4.5 - 5.0
4.6-4.9
5.3 - 5.8
3.0- 3.5
3.4- 3.8
3.0- 3.2
4.2 - 4.5
6.4-6.6
2.5 - 2.8
NOTE: Does not include costs of QF contracts which have significant impacts on overall utility
power costs in New England, New York, New Jersey, and California.
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